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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of social norms on the effect of 
(im)moral behaviour recollection on pro-self and pro-social decisions in the present 
(Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). Additionally, social anxiety was hypothesised to be a 
moderator of the effects of social norms and (im)moral recollection on pro-self/pro-social 
decisions. Four-hundred and four participants (211 female / 193 male) were asked to recollect 
either a moral, immoral or neutral act in the past. After completion, $0.50 were awarded to 
participants, who were asked to allocate the money in virtual $0.10 coins into two jars; the 
jars represented a pro-social cause (charity) or a pro-self cause (entering a lottery). Social 
norms (injunctive and descriptive) were manipulated by presenting different amounts of 
money in two jars that simulated money allocation decisions of previous participants. It was 
found that participants across the conditions allocated more money to the lottery than to 
charity. It was shown that (im)moral recollections, social norms, and social anxiety did not 
have a significant effect on pro-self and pro-social decisions (i.e., the money allocation across 
jars).  
Keywords: social norms, moral recollection, social anxiety.  
INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL NORMS ON MORAL SELF-REGULATION 3 
 
The Influence of Social Norms on Moral Self-Regulation 
 Our past behaviour influences us in present decisions. We might, for example, feel 
that a past behaviour entitles or restricts us to engage in certain behaviour in the present. 
Research has shown that our past moral or immoral behaviour can have such entitling or 
restricting impact on our future moral behaviour (Monin & Jordan, 2009). The definition of 
(im)Moral behaviour is subject to society’s concept of morality, which grows and develops 
with the experiences society makes and could thus be considered as a guide for enhancing the 
societal standard (Campbell, 1957; Codol, 1975; Smith, 1759/1790). According to the moral 
self-regulation theory, people who engaged in immoral behaviour are likely to engage in 
moral behaviour in a future situation, while people who engaged in moral behaviour are likely 
to act immorally in a future situation (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Past research has 
referred to these two consecutive behaviours as moral licensing (past moral behaviour, 
followed by immoral behaviour; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001) and 
moral cleansing (past immoral behaviour, followed by moral behaviour; Sachdeva, Iliev, & 
Medin, 2009; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Moral licensing and moral cleansing can be 
summarised to moral self-regulation, for indicating a balancing (i.e., inconsistent) behaviour 
(Sachdeva et al., 2009). In three studies, Sachdeva et al. (2009) show that threat and 
affirmation to one’s moral identity can cause a balancing effect: moral threat leads to the 
motivation of re-establishing one’s moral identity, while moral affirmation leads to a 
perceived entitlement for immoral behaviour without threatening one’s moral identity. 
However, regulatory behaviour does not always occur, as people might also be consistent in 
their behaviour, so that a past moral behaviour is followed by another moral behaviour (Reed, 
Aquino, & Levy, 2007), and past immoral behaviour is followed by another immoral 
behaviour (Conway & Peetz, 2012). 
The present study investigated when past moral or immoral behaviour leads to 
balancing and when to consistent behaviour. We expect that experiencing a threat to or an 
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affirmation of one’s moral identity, paired with social norms, could discriminate between 
balancing and consistent moral behaviour. In what follows, the introduced ideas are explained 
in more detail. 
Moral Identity 
 Most people want to be a moral person (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; 
Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), and they want others to perceive them as such (Blanken, Van 
de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015). Furthermore, morality seems to be the most important factor in 
the evaluation of others (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). Thus, people have a moral identity, i.e. 
people have a moral self-concept with an associated set of values and traits (Aquino & Reed, 
2002). Our moral identity might be challenged when we behave inconsistently to it. These 
inconsistencies can lead to a feeling of uneasiness (Festinger, 1954). As a result, individuals 
have the need to be consistent in their moral behaviour, and thus avoiding challenges to their 
moral self-concept (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). Moral affirmation and moral threat 
can influence this need for consistency.  
Moral affirmation. Individual receiving an affirmation to their moral identity might 
perceive the affirmation as evidence of having a strong moral identity; this in turn might 
motivate individuals for further moral behaviour (Reed et al., 2007). Instead, moral self-
regulation theory suggests that people who feel affirmed in their moral identity are likely to 
behave inconsistently, as they are inclined to engage in moral licensing (Sachdeva et al., 
2009). In fact, people might feel that, after a moral behaviour, their moral identity is strong 
enough to justify little deviations from moral behaviour. Consequently, immoral behaviour, 
which preceded moral behaviour, would not change a person’s moral self-concept, as this 
behaviour might be seen as within the borders of their affirmed moral identity (Khan & Dhar, 
2006). After having achieved a moral identity, strengthened through affirmation, individuals 
are merely interested in maintaining this moral identity, instead of striving for a stronger 
moral identity (Jordan et al., 2011). This might lead to a reduction in moral behaviour. Thus, 
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moral behaviour might lead to balancing behaviour in the future, because it serves as 
affirmation for one’s moral identity.  
Moral threat. In opposition to moral affirmation stands moral threat. The feeling of 
uneasiness that derives from a feeling of dissonance is likely to arise when people, who 
perceive themselves to have a strong moral identity, behave in an immoral fashion. According 
to Festinger (1954), people who feel dissonance will engage in regulatory measures like 
changing behaviour, cognition, or engage in denial. Thus, when experiencing a threat to one’s 
moral identity, it is theorised that individuals are most likely to change their behaviour, and 
engage in moral behaviour (moral cleansing): deviations from their moral identity are seen as 
temporary and moral behaviour is able to reduce the identity threat to one’s moral identity 
(Jordan et al., 2011). This is in line with the Social Identity Theory: when individuals feel 
threatened in their identity, they cling harder to this identity and engage in identity affirming 
actions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a result, individuals that experience a threat to their moral 
identity would be most likely to engage in moral behaviour, i.e. in balancing behaviour, in 
order to reaffirm to themselves and to their group, to be a moral person.  
This implies that individuals have the same moral standards as their group. However, 
it can be the case that individuals’ idea of morality deviates from the group they are in. In this 
case, individuals could perceive their own idea of morality as the objectively better one and 
thus prefer it over the group’s standard of morality (Peterson, Smith, Tannenbaum, & Shaw, 
2009). Consequently, individuals evaluate decisions and actions on their own standards alone, 
regardless of what the moral standards of the group are. In this situation, a threat to one’s 
moral identity is a very personal one and individuals might be more concerned with 
reaffirming their own moral standards to themselves than to their group. On the other hand 
people might also engage in self-deception, when evaluating their moral behaviour, and thus 
do not acknowledge or see their own wrong doing (Vecina, Chacón, & Pérez-Viejo, 2016). In 
this case it is likely that individuals do not experience a threat to their moral identity that 
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easily. As a result, individuals’ initial immoral behaviour could be followed by another 
immoral behaviour, thus being consistent in their behaviours. 
The Role of Social Norms 
If individuals, however, experience a threat and acknowledge the moral standards of 
their own group as their standards, then the need of reaffirmation to the group might be 
stronger than the reaffirmation to the self. Hence, individuals might not only be anxious to 
jeopardize their own moral identity, but also to lose their group and thus be deprived of a 
source of self-esteem and feeling of belongingness (Knowles & Gardner, 2008). In this case, 
social norms are expected to have a strong impact on deciding whether to act consistently or 
inconsistently after a moral threat. Social norms can be divided in injunctive and descriptive 
norms. Injunctive norms are what people ought to do, what is commonly seen as the right 
thing to do (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1990). The concept of morality is created on the base 
of our social experiences (Smith, 1759/1790), i.e. our concept of morality grows and develops 
with the experiences our society makes (Campbell, 1957). Thus, behaviour could be seen as 
moral when it is in line with the injunctive norm, as it represents society’s ideal behaviour 
that should prevail as it adds positively to the standards of society (Codol, 1975). Thus, an 
injunctive norm can be seen as pro-social. Descriptive norms on the other hand are norms that 
represent how the majority of people actually behaves, which can be both pro-social and pro-
self (Cialdini et al., 1990). Pro-self behaviour is not necessarily an immoral behaviour. 
However, if one chooses to engage in pro-self behaviour over pro-social behaviour, it might 
be seen as immoral behaviour. Conflicts between injunctive and descriptive norms can 
especially be observed, when the injunctive norm is tending towards pro-social interests, 
while the descriptive norm tends towards pro-self interests (Bicchieri, 2006). When 
experiencing the fear of social rejection, one might adhere to the descriptive norm, as it 
represents the group more clearly in the situation than the injunctive norm.  
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Basing on the overview above, we expect that moral threat or affirmation, as well as 
descriptive norm or injunctive norm, could explain the tendency towards balancing or 
consistent behaviour. The present study investigates this expectation by assessing how past 
moral or immoral behaviour, in the presence of either a descriptive and/or an injunctive norm, 
influences choosing either a pro-social or pro-self option. 
Impact on moral identity threat and affirmation. Experiencing a threat to one’s 
moral identity is likely to lead to regulatory behaviour in the form of cleansing (Sachdeva et 
al., 2009). However, people who engage in immoral behaviour might fear negative reactions 
from the group, as morality is one of the major person evaluation factors (Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). Thus, it is most likely that people, who feel their moral identity 
threatened, will adhere to the descriptive norm given by the group, to repair the damaged self-
image, but also to avoid negative feedback from the group. As a result, we do not expect 
people to engage in moral cleansing as a straight result of the felt dissonance, but rather that 
people act in line with the dominant tendency in society, because of their fear for rejection. 
This choice should be independent of the nature of the norm; as it can be pro-social, or pro-
self, i.e. following one’s self interest. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: When recalling immoral behaviour, that is, when one experiences a 
moral threat, an individual chooses to behave in accordance with the descriptive norm, 
independently of being pro-self or pro-social. In the absence of a descriptive norm, an 
individual will choose a pro-social option over a pro-self option, as the injunctive 
norm is the only information one has available to infer which option is more approved 
by society.  
Affirming one’s moral identity is likely to strengthen one’s identity to such an extent 
that small deviations can be justified. Additionally, it might be that this affirmation to one’s 
moral identity is that strong that it will also boost one’s self-esteem, leading to a stronger 
independence of the support by others; this leads to the following hypothesis.  
INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL NORMS ON MORAL SELF-REGULATION 8 
 
Hypothesis 2: When recalling moral behaviour and being presented with a pro-self and 
pro-social option, an individual chooses the pro-self option, independent of the present 
norms. 
The Influence of Social Anxiety  
 The decision to follow or to disregard social norms might be affected by social 
anxiety: Socially anxious individuals have the fear of humiliation and embarrassment when 
feeling observed by others (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). This might lead to a 
greater attendance to social cues, like facial cues but also to a greater avoidance of eye 
contact, especially when being confronted with angry faces (Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & 
Gordon, 2003; Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2004; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 
2009). Furthermore, Horley et al. (2003) found the tendency of individuals with strong social 
anxiety to avoid social situations in general. Together, these studies show that people high in 
social anxiety are exceedingly conscious about their surroundings, and extremely careful to 
avoid any action that might result in negative feedback (Van Dillen, Enter, Peters, van Dijk, 
& Rotteveel, 2017). Thus, it is theorised that socially anxious people more strongly influenced 
by a descriptive norm than are people low in social anxiety, as the anxiety might increase the 
experienced threat of exclusion. Furthermore, even though individuals experience an 
affirmation in their moral identity, individuals high in social anxiety, could be still likely to 
experience a strong need of acceptance by the group. As a result, when experiencing a moral 
affirmation it is expected that individuals high in social anxiety will adhere to the descriptive 
norm to a greater extent than individuals with low social anxiety, who might disregard social 
norms altogether. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Both when experiencing a moral threat and a moral, individuals high in 
social anxiety will adhere stronger to the descriptive norm than individuals low in 
social anxiety.  
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 The three hypotheses were investigated by assessing how recalling of past moral 
(moral affirmation condition), immoral (moral threat condition), and neutral (control 
condition) behaviour affect current pro-self and pro-social decisions, in the presence of an 
injunctive norm and a descriptive norm. Moral threat/affirmation was manipulated by asking 
participants to recollect one of the three behaviours (moral, immoral, neutral), while current 
pro-self and pro-social decisions were assessed by asking participants to either donate money 
to charity or to contribute to an amount of money that can be won in a lottery, when 
contributing to it. Furthermore, social norms were manipulated by providing an indication of 
how many people previously have taken each decision. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Four-hundred and fifty-two participants took part in the experiment. Forty-eight 
participants were excluded from all analyses, as they failed the manipulation check: 
participants, who did not score an average of 3 or higher on a 7-point scale, with (1) not at all 
and (7) very much (cf. Van Dillen et al., 2017) on negative emotion items in the moral threat 
condition and on positive emotion items in the moral affirmation condition, were excluded. 
The remaining 404 participants (211 female / 193 male) had a mean age of 39 (SD = 11.7, 
range 19 to 76). All participants had a high school education or higher (31.2 percent 
high school, 58.7 percent college, 10.1 percent graduate school). With a mean of 4.71 (SD = 
1.62, range 1 to 8), participants reported to perceive themselves be on the lower spectrum of 
socio-economic-status (SES); 1 being the lowest, 10 being the highest SES). The participants 
were recruited from the U.S. website MTURK. 
The design was a 3 (morality) x 3 (social norm) experimental design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the moral affirmation condition (moral affirmation, 
N = 131), the moral threat condition (moral threat, N = 118) or the control condition (neutral 
control, N = 155). In addition, participants were randomly assigned to a match condition (i.e., 
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the descriptive norm coincides with the injunctive norm; N = 135), mismatch norm condition 
(i.e., the descriptive norm opposes the injunctive norm; N = 131) or baseline condition (i.e., 
no descriptive norm is present; N = 138). Furthermore, two continuous variables were 
assessed: participants’ social anxiety and self-monitoring skills. The latter will be discussed 
by collaborators in another thesis using a self-monitoring scale by Snyder (1974). 
Measures  
 Moral threat and affirmation. Participants engaged in an autobiographic recall task 
(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In this task participants were asked to write down a detailed 
description of an act of past immoral (threat condition) or moral (affirmation condition) 
behaviour. In addition, as neutral control condition, participants were asked to recall their last 
visit to a supermarket (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Furthermore, participants were asked to 
report emotions that they felt in the recalled situations, in order to induce threat or affirmation 
to their moral identity more strongly. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
mentioned conditions. 
 To ensure a successful manipulation of moral identity threat or affirmation, i.e. 
compared to the control condition, a manipulation check was included. The manipulation 
check was administered by asking Participants to indicate their current emotional state by 
rating the extent to which they feel five positive emotions (happiness, good feelings about the 
self, pleasure, satisfaction, pride), and seven negative emotions (sadness, guilt, disgust, 
shame, bad feelings about the self, anger, fear), on a 7-point scale, with (1) not at all and (7) 
very much (cf. Van Dillen et al., 2017). The check was considered successful if participants 
experienced more negative than positive emotions in the threat condition and more positive 
than negative emotions in the affirmation condition. 
Balancing versus consistency. For assessing whether participants engage in 
balancing behaviour (i.e., self-licensing, moral cleansing) or are consistent in their behaviour, 
we provided participants with the opportunity to either engage in pro-social behaviour by 
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donating to charity, and/or to engage in pro-self behaviour by contributing to a lottery, and 
thus acquiring the chance of winning it. To this end, participants received $0.50, in form of 
virtual $0.10 coins, and were asked to allocate this money over the two virtual jars
1
 (Charity
2
, 
Lottery). To note is that with $0.50 participants were not being able to split the money equally 
between the two jars. Furthermore, the more money participants placed into the Lottery Jar, 
the higher were their chances to win the lottery: for every $0.10 allocated to the Lottery Jar, 
the identification number of participants was added to the pool of numbers from which the 
winner of the lottery was drawn. The amount of money that participants put in the jars 
provided a measure for moral consistency and moral balancing, as well as adherence to the 
injunctive and descriptive norm, as the jars represent a pro-self (Lottery Jar) and a pro-social 
(Charity Jar) option. Consistent behaviour was present, if participants experiencing a moral 
affirmation gave more money to charity (Pro-social) than lottery (Pro-self), and if participants 
experiencing a moral threat placed more money to lottery (Pro-self) than to charity (Pro-
social). Instead, balancing behaviour was present, if participants, who experienced a moral 
affirmation, allocated more money to the lottery (Pro-self) than to charity (Pro-social), and if 
participants, who experienced a moral threat, and gave more money to charity (Pro-self) than 
lottery (Pro-social). 
Norms. The norms were manipulated in three conditions. In the first condition, the 
match condition, more money was shown to be placed in the Charity Jar than in the Lottery 
Jar in order to create a descriptive norm for donating to charity, which coincides with the 
injunctive norm, see Appendix Figure 1a for the visualisation of the jars. In the second 
condition, the mismatch condition, more money was shown to be placed in the Lottery Jar 
than in the Charity Jar, in order to create the descriptive norm on giving the money to the 
lottery, see Appendix Figure 1b. In the third condition, the baseline condition, both jars were 
displayed containing an equal amount of money, in order to avoid creating a descriptive norm, 
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see Appendix Figure 1c. Participants were informed that the displayed money in the jars was 
allocated to the jars by previous participants to create a group that provides the social norms. 
Procedure 
 In an online experiment, participants were asked to first provide relevant information, 
including age, gender, education, and socio-economic-status. This part also contained the 28-
item Social Anxiety and Distress scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) with a modified response 
(High & Caplan, 2009), namely a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) for assessing social anxiety. The scale was comprised of negative items 
like “I am usually nervous with people unless I know them well.”, and positive items like “I 
don't mind talking to people at parties or social gatherings”. Second, participants were asked 
to recall either a moral (moral affirmation), an immoral (moral threat), or a neutral (control) 
personal behaviour. Following this, a manipulation check was incorporated in form of a 
questionnaire about the participant’s current emotional state. Next, participants were thanked 
for participation. Afterwards, participants received a chance to participate in the lottery, 
which had been previously mentioned as an announced incentive to participate. However, 
only at this moment they were informed that they could choose to participate in the lottery by 
putting money in a Lottery Jar or to donate the money to a charity, by putting money in a 
Charity Jar.  The money was given additionally to the participation reimbursement. 
Completed the task, participants were asked about the purpose of the study, thanked, and 
debriefed.  
Results 
Emotions Following Moral Recollection 
Prior of testing the hypotheses two, repeated-measurement analyses of variances (RM-
ANOVA) of the negative and positive emotions, reported by the participants, were performed, 
to assess whether the manipulation of moral affirmation, moral threat, or the neutral control 
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condition was successful. The means and standard deviations for the negative feeling items 
and the positive feeling items are presented in Table 1. 
The seven negative emotions and their interaction with the moral recollection 
conditions were significantly different from each other (F Huynh-Feldt Main-Effect(4.62, 1851.86) = 
60.30, p < 0.001; F Huynh-Feldt Interaction-Effect(9.24, 1851.86) = 80.50, p < 0.001). It was found that 
participants in the moral threat condition scored significantly higher on all negative items 
(i.e., Sadness, Guilt, Disgust, Shame, Bad Feelings About Yourself, Anger, Fear) than 
participants in the moral affirmation or control condition (Fs(2,401) > 10.11, ps < 0.001, η2s > 
0.05). The strongest effect of the moral threat condition was observed for guilt, shame and 
bad feelings (Fs(2,401) > 319.41, ps < 0.001, η2s > 0.61 ). Participants’ ratings on negative 
items in the control and moral affirmation condition did not differ significantly from each 
other (ps > 0.074, means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1). This indicates that 
the moral threat condition succeeded in inducing negative moral emotions in participants.  
The five positive emotions and their interaction with the recollection conditions 
differed significantly as well (F Huynh-Feldt Main-Effect(3.68, 1473.89) = 48.49, p < 0.001; FHuynh-
Feldt Interaction-Effect(7.35, 1473.89) = 25.40, p < 0.001). Participants in the moral affirmation 
condition were found to score significantly higher on all positive emotion items (i.e., Happy, 
Good Feeling About Yourself, Pleasure, Satisfaction, Pride) compared to participants in the 
control condition, and in the moral threat condition, who scored significantly lower on 
positive emotion items compared to the control condition (Fs(2,401) > 61.73, ps < 0.001, η2s 
> 0.24, means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1). The strongest effect of the 
moral affirmation condition was recorded for Good Feeling About Yourself (η2 = 0.45) and 
Pride (η2 = 0.45). This shows that the moral affirmation condition evoked the desired positive 
emotions to a greater extent than the other conditions; accordingly, the manipulation of moral 
affirmation was successful.  
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The Effect of Moral Recollection and Social Norms on Money Distribution 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were tested by performing a 3 (recollection conditions) 
x 3 (social norm conditions) factorial ANOVA
3
 with contribution to the lottery (i.e., pro-self 
option) as dependent variable.  
On average, participants in all three moral recollection conditions, as well as in all 
three social norm conditions, allocated more money to the Lottery Jar than to the Charity Jar. 
Participants did not vary in their contribution to the Lottery Jar across the recollection 
conditions (F(2, 395) = 0.17, p = 0.848). Participants who recollected their last visit to the 
supermarket contributed slightly more money to the lottery (M = 3.70, SD = 1.57) than 
participants who experienced a moral affirmation (M = 3.63, SD = 1.59), or moral threat (who 
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations for negative and positive feeling items in the three recollection 
conditions on 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
 Moral 
Affirmation 
Moral Threat 
Control 
 
Sadness  1.84 (1.51) 3.95 (1.89) 1.52 (1.09)  
Guilt 1.47 (1.29) 5.75 (1.40) 1.32 (.83)  
Disgust 1.54 (1.43) 3.83 (1.98) 1.53 (1.18)  
Shame 1.38 (1.13) 5.22 (1.72) 1.30 (1.00)  
Bad feelings 1.31 (.92) 5.19 (1.78) 1.57 (1.29)  
Anger 1.62 (1.50) 2.38 (1.67) 1.68 (1.33)  
Fear 1.39 (1.05) 2.60 (1.79) 1.47 (1.21)  
     
Happiness 4.69 (2.03) 1.67 (1.28) 3.82 (2.04)  
Good Feeling 5.57 (1.74) 1.61 (1.13) 3.97 (2.07)  
Pleasure 4.26 (2.19) 1.58 (1.24) 3.54 (2.18)  
Satisfaction 5.39 (1.92) 1.69 (1.40) 4.23 (2.29)  
Pride 5.21 (1.88) 1.38 (.91) 2.99 (1.93)  
Note. Brackets show the standard deviations. 
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contributed least money to the Lottery Jar; M = 3.58, SD = 1.61). Furthermore, there was a 
non-significant main effect for the social norm conditions (F(2, 395) = 0.24, p = 0.787). 
Participants distributed their money over the jars independently of the social norm conditions, 
but contributed the least money to the lottery in the match condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.61). 
Contribution increased slightly in the baseline condition (M = 3.64, SD = 1.59). The highest 
contribution to the Lottery Jar occurred in the mismatch condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.56). 
Interaction of moral recollection and social norms. The first hypothesis aimed to 
assess, how participants who experienced a moral threat would distribute the five dimes over 
the two jars (Charity Jar or Lottery Jar), depending on the descriptive norm, presented in three 
social norm conditions (Match, Mismatch, Baseline). Important for Hypotheses 1, there was a 
non-significant interaction between the moral recollection conditions and social norm 
conditions (F(4, 395) = 0.99, p = 0.413). That is, there is no difference in participants’ 
allocation of coins over the jars when jointly considering moral recollection conditions and 
social norm conditions. Hence, participants in the moral threat condition did not allocate their 
coins depending on the descriptive norm in the match and mismatch condition. Furthermore 
participants did not choose the pro-social option over the pro-self option in the baseline 
condition, where no descriptive norm was present. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. The 
descriptive statistics for the interaction effects are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Model 1: Means and standard deviations for the main and interaction effects of the moral 
recollection and social norm conditions. 
 Match Mismatch Baseline 
Moral 3.36 (1.58) 4.00 (1.62) 3.55 (1.52) 
Immoral 3.72 (1.72) 3.52 (1.56) 3.51 (1.60) 
Control 3.69 (1.56) 3.62 (1.50) 3.78 (1.65) 
Note. Brackets indicate the standard deviations.  
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With the second hypothesis we wanted to test if participants, who recollected past 
moral behaviour would opt for the pro-self option independently from the presented social 
norms. In line with Hypothesis 2, participants’ contribution to the Lottery Jar in the moral 
affirmation condition did not differ across the social norm conditions: participants allocated 
more money to the Lottery Jar than to the Charity Jar, regardless of the communicated 
descriptive norms (F(4, 395) = 0.99, p = 0.413). However, as there was no difference in the 
contribution to the Lottery Jar between the social norm conditions across all three recollection 
conditions, it is to assume that Hypothesis 2 was not supported. In addition, participants 
experiencing a moral affirmation in the match condition contributed marginally less money to 
the Lottery Jar (M = 3.36, SD = 1.58) than participants in the mismatch condition (M = 4.00, 
SD = 1.62, p = 0.06). We hypothesised no difference in the money allocation to the two jars 
across the social norm conditions; thus it is to conclude that Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Social Anxiety  
The social anxiety scale showed a high reliability (NItems = 28, Cronbach’s Alpha = 
0.98). With a mean of 2.95 (SD = 1.07, range 1.91 to 3.33), participants were somewhat low 
in social anxiety, although 51 percent scored higher than three (scale ranged from 1 strongly 
disagree to 5 strongly agree, with 3 being neither agree nor disagree). This indicates that 
most participants, score close to 3 and thus are only somewhat socially anxious. For the 
analysis social anxiety ratings were standardised. 
Social anxiety and its influence. In Hypothesis 3 we tested whether social anxiety 
can strengthen the adherence to the descriptive norm, which was assessed by including social 
anxiety as a moderator. To assess the moderating effect of social anxiety on the effect of 
moral recollection conditions and social norms on choosing pro-social or pro-self, another 
factorial ANOVA was run, with contribution to the Lottery Jar as dependent variable; 
recollection conditions and social norm conditions were used as independent variables and 
social anxiety as continuous variable. Social anxiety was not found to moderate the effect of 
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the two factors on money distribution: there were no significant main effects of social anxiety 
(F(1,386) = 0.16, p = 0.694), recollection conditions (F(2,386) = 0.19, p = 0.829) or social 
norm conditions (F(2,386) = 0.20, p = 0.819), nor were there any significant two-way 
(Fs < 0.95, ps > 0.437) or three-way interaction effects between the three variables 
(F(4,386) = 0.45, p = 0.772). That is, social anxiety has no influence on the interaction 
between recollection conditions and social norm conditions on money distribution across the 
two jars. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
 
Table 3 
Mean and standard errors for donations to the lottery as a function of social norm conditions 
and moral recollection conditions for high vs. low social anxiety (estimated for respectively ± 
1 SD from the overall mean of the standardised Social Anxiety and Distress Scale scores). 
 Low Social Anxiety  High Social Anxiety 
 
Moral 
Affirmation 
Moral 
Threat 
Control  
Moral 
Affirmation 
Moral 
Threat 
Control 
Match 3.55 (.23) 3.55 (.23) 3.38 (.24)  3.74 (.24) 3.73 (.22) 3.91 (.24) 
Mismatch 3.66 (.25) 3.63 (.21) 3.82 (.24)  3.63 (.25) 3.66 (.22) 3.47 (.25) 
Base 3.78 (.25) 3.40 (.28) 3.60 (.24)  3.51 (.25) 3.89 (.24) 3.69 (.24) 
Note. Brackets indicate the standard errors. 
 
In order to better understand social anxiety in connection with social norms, means 
and standard errors of the allocated coins to the Lottery Jar across the three moral recollection 
conditions and the three social norm conditions were assessed for one standard deviation 
below and one standard deviation above the standardised mean of social anxiety (means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 3). It can be observed that participants low in social 
anxiety seem to follow the descriptive norm to a certain extend across the moral recollection 
conditions: participants allocated slightly more money to the Lottery Jar in the mismatch 
condition (Ms > 3.63, SEs < 0.25) than in the match condition (Ms < 3.55, SEs < 0.24). On the 
other hand, individuals high in social anxiety allocated more money across moral recollection 
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conditions to the Lottery Jar in the match condition (Ms > 3.73, SEs < 0.24) than in the 
mismatch condition (Ms < 3.66, SEs < 0.25). This comparison of the direction of means is 
contradictory to Hypothesis 3. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to increase our understanding about balancing and 
consistent behaviour by introducing social norms as a possible determinant and social anxiety 
as possible moderator of the effect of moral threat/affirmation and social norms on pro-self 
and pro-social decisions. We could not replicate the moral self-regulation theory (i.e., 
balancing behaviour; Sachdeva et al., 2009), as the moral recollection conditions did not have 
an effect on current pro-self and pro-social decisions. Furthermore, we were unable to find an 
effect of social norms on the effect of moral threat/affirmation on pro-self and pro-social 
decisions. We expected that when experiencing a moral threat, one would adhere more 
strongly to the descriptive norm regardless of whether it is on the pro-social or the pro-self 
option (Hypothesis 1). In addition, we hypothesised that experiencing a moral affirmation, 
one would chose the pro-self option regardless of the present descriptive norm (Hypothesis 2). 
Both hypotheses were not supported. Moreover, the effect of moral threat/affirmation, and 
social norms on the distribution of coins was not mediated by social anxiety (Hypothesis 3). 
Greater Contribution to Lottery Jar 
 On average, participants allocated more money to the Lottery Jar than to the Charity 
Jar, across conditions. This might be due to our choice of administering the dependent 
variable: Participants could not divide the money in half, thus they had to choose one jar to 
allocate the most money to. According to Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman’s (1989) 
social utility functions, individuals get the most utility (i.e. satisfaction) from dividing the 
money equally. However, should this option be unavailable, as it is the case in the present 
study, individuals prefer inequality to their favour over inequality favouring others, i.e. 
individuals prefer to allocate more money to themselves than to others (Loewenstein et al., 
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1989). Such self-favouring inequality was observed in the present study, as three quarters of 
all participants contributed more money to the Lottery Jar than to the Charity Jar. In addition, 
according to the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), individuals are more likely to 
take high risks with low chance of winning (as in the lottery used in the present study), when 
the alternative to the risk is a sure loss, namely giving the money to charity. The money 
initially awarded to the participants is automatically seen as a gain, as participants take 
psychological ownership of the money (Shu & Peck, 2011). However, participants were 
immediately asked to distribute the allotted money over the two jars. As a result, participants 
might see the allocation of money as a loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Nevertheless, 
participants had still the change of gaining a large amount of money by winning the lottery. 
Consequently, as people are loss averse (i.e., a loss is more upsetting than a gain of the same 
amount is pleasurable) and the potential gain is large enough to outweigh the negative effect 
of the perceived loss, participants are likely to be risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Thus, it is highly likely that participants chose to take the risk of participating in the lottery, 
and displaying a tendency for risk seeking. Given this, the effects of moral recollection 
conditions and social norm conditions on pro-social versus pro-self decisions might be much 
more subtle. Thus, direction of means will be interpreted in addition to the significance tests. 
Consistency Following Moral Threat 
 We were unable to support Hypothesis 1, as participants in the moral threat condition 
did not follow the descriptive norm. On the contrary, participants displayed consistent 
behaviour, i.e. participants chose the pro-self option following the recollection of immoral 
behaviour. A reason for this might be that participants were not concerned to be rejected by 
the group for disregarding the descriptive norm, as they might not have experienced the 
pressure of the descriptive norm, because of a perceived lack of accountability and 
consequences. As Tetlock (1985) argues, accountability is crucial to ensure adherence to 
norms and rules. Hence, participants might have disregarded the descriptive norm, as a result 
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of not being held accountable for their actions and thus unlikely to face the consequences. 
However, this argumentation disregards the motivation of participants to mend their 
threatened moral identity (Jordan et al., 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, it is unlikely that 
a lack of accountability alone was the reason for consistent behaviour. 
 Another reason for participants to allocate more money to the Lottery Jar than to the 
Charity Jar, after a moral threat, might be mood regulation. Following the recollection of an 
immoral behaviour, participants reported high level of negative emotions, which evoked the 
urge to engage in mood enhancement (Isen, 1984). The current study suggests that lottery 
might be seen as the best way to enhance one’s mood after a moral threat. This might be due 
to the lottery’s uncertain, distant outcome, as it leads to high level of construal (temporal 
construal-level theory, Trope & Liberman, 2000). Trope and Liberman (2000) argue that the 
greater the temporal distance, the more abstract is the outcome and, most importantly, the 
greater is the perceived value of the outcome. Furthermore, Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman 
(2002) show that the value of an outcome increases independently of the probability for this 
outcome. Thus, although participants are unlikely to win the lottery (as there is only one 
winner), the lottery is likely to be constructed to have such great value, that the prospect of 
winning alone increases one’s mood.  
Following the Descriptive Norm after Moral Affirmation 
 Hypothesis 2 was not supported as well: instead of disregarding the social norms and 
opting for the pro-self choice, participants who experienced a moral affirmation were 
somewhat following the descriptive norm, considering that effects might be more subtle 
through the overall tendency of participants to allocate more money to the Lottery Jar, as 
argued above. Participants in the Match condition allocated less money to the Lottery Jar and 
more money to the Charity Jar, compared to participants in the Mismatch condition. This 
could mean that participants in the moral affirmation condition are somewhat influenced or 
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threatened by group exclusion, instead of being immune as a result of self-affirmation, as 
hypothesised.  
 An explanation for this might be the continuation of positive emotions. Positive 
emotions are highly desired and so is their continuation, especially after being made aware of 
one’s emotional state (i.e., mood maintenance; Caruso & Shafir, 2006; Peters, Västfjäll, 
Gärling, & Slovic, 2006). Participants were asked to indicate their emotional state and were 
thus highly aware of it. Hence, it is likely that participants were motivated to maintain their 
positive emotions. As the direction of means showed, following the descriptive norm could be 
a valid indication for positive feelings, as social inclusion is a source of self-esteem and sense 
of belongingness (Knowles & Gardner, 2008). It is to notice that participants experiencing a 
moral affirmation are avoidant of negative feedback to a greater extent than participants 
experiencing a moral threat, as negative feedback could endanger their positive mood 
(Knowles & Gardner, 2008). Participants experiencing a moral threat might be more approach 
oriented to enhance their negative mood, i.e. participating in the lottery. 
Counter-Intuitive effects of Social Anxiety 
 With respect to the third hypothesis, the present study showed that social anxiety had 
no influence on the effect of social norms and moral recollection on choosing pro-self or pro-
social behaviours. Furthermore, social anxiety somewhat seemed to encourage following the 
descriptive norm when it is low and disrespecting social norms when it is high. This is 
interesting, as it was hypothesised the opposite for moral threat and affirmation in the first 
two hypotheses: when being a moral person is reaffirmed, participants do not follow the 
social norms, as anxiety to be expelled from the group is likely to be low (Hypothesis 2). 
However, when one’s self-concept is threatened by immoral act recollection, participants 
were expected to follow the descriptive norm, as anxiety to be judged by or expelled from the 
group is increased (Hypothesis 1). The present study has shown that Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 were not supported, but that the observed pattern of means is in reversed 
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direction of what was hypothesized. Thus, it might be not surprise to observe the reversed 
effect for social anxiety as well (Hypothesis 3). 
 It might be that high levels of anxiety lead to mood management, in a similar way as 
moral threat evokes managing negative emotions. In favour of this explanation would be that 
anxiety is a negative and distressing emotion, and the desire to feel better could possibly 
prompt people to manage their anxiety by allocating more money to the Lottery Jar to 
enhance their mood through the prospect of winning the lottery (Isen, 1984; Trope and 
Liberman, 2000)). As a result, participants high in social anxiety would seem to be more 
susceptible to the prospect of winning the lottery than participants low in social anxiety, no 
matter which norm or moral recollection condition they were in. Participants of all moral 
recollection conditions, who scored low in social anxiety, displayed a pattern of means across 
social norm conditions, similar to participants in the moral affirmation condition. This 
indicates that participants low in social anxiety and who experienced a moral threat are not as 
influenced by the threat as individuals high in social anxiety, because they display the same 
mood preserving tendency compared to participants who experienced an affirmation to their 
moral identity. This suggests that predisposed social anxiety might influence coping with 
emotionally difficult situations. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 One possible limitation was dividing the $0.50 in $0.10 coins, in order to prevent 
participants from dividing their money equally across the two jars. This most likely led to a 
more selfish money allocation, as mentioned above. In relation to this, a risk seeking tendency 
might have arisen from first awarding the $0.50, then asking participants to give up the 
money, with a chance of winning a large amount of money. Future studies might consider 
increasing the sample size to confirm empirically the subtle effects observed in the current 
study. Furthermore, the large win should be divided in several small wins, to decrease risk 
seeking behaviour. Likewise, the $0.50 should not be awarded to participants directly. A 
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possible alternative might be to ask participants to allocate the money owned by the 
experimenter, but according to their own liking, and still with the chance to win the lottery, 
should they decide to allocate money to the lottery. This might decrease risk seeking 
behaviour even further, as it could avoid loss aversion. 
 Another limitation was the virtual presentation of the jars. It is likely that participants 
did not perceive the jars as genuine enough: participants might have had struggles to believe 
that the coins displayed in the jars had actually been allocated by other participants. This 
could mean that the second independent variable, namely the social norm conditions, did not 
convey the descriptive norm strongly enough. As a result, participants might have allocated 
more money to the Lottery than to the Charity Jar, as they did not feel the presence of the 
group pressure. It is advisable to conduct future studies as laboratory studies, in which 
material jars and money can be presented. 
 Following the moral recollection conditions we asked participants to rate their current 
emotional state for seven negative and five positive items. Given that anxiety might not just 
have been relevant in a social, dispositional form but also in a general, situational form after 
the recollection, it could be advisable to include anxiety to the seven negative items. 
Conclusion 
 The presented study was unable to provide empirical support for the effects of social 
norms and moral recollection on pro-self/pro-social decision making, as well as for influences 
of social anxiety on this effect. Participants across conditions allocated more money to the 
Lottery Jar than to the Charity Jar, which might be due to the design of the study, as it might 
have caused a greater tendency to be self-interested and risk seeking in participants. However, 
small differences between means were observed, which indicate that participants somewhat 
disregarded social norms after a moral threat and tended to follow the descriptive norm after a 
moral affirmation. A similar pattern of means was observed for social anxiety: participants 
low in social anxiety somewhat followed the descriptive norm across the moral recollection 
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conditions, while participants low in social anxiety disregarded the descriptive norm across 
the moral recollection conditions. The differences need to be seen as mere indication, as 
empirical support is yet to be provided. 
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Appendix 
 
       UNICEF            Lottery 
Figure 1a. Social norm condition. Match: descriptive and injunctive norm are on the pro-
social option, represented by the amount of money in the jars. 
 
       UNICEF            Lottery 
Figure 1b. Social norm condition. Mismatch: descriptive norm is on pro-self option, while the 
injunctive norm is on the pro-social option, represented by the amount of money in the jars. 
 
 
       UNICEF            Lottery 
Figure 1c. Social norm condition. Baseline: no descriptive norm is present, as no money is 
displayed and injunctive norm are on the pro-social option. 
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Footnotes 
1
     In a pilot study we investigated how best to visualise the jars. Forty-three participants 
were presented with a shortened form of the final study. With three conditions we wanted to 
investigate if we should present participants with a photograph of the jars or a drawing of the 
jars and if the jar, which is without the descriptive norm should be either completely empty or 
filled a little bit. For this trial we just presented the norm mismatch condition of the final 
study (i.e., the descriptive norm is on the Lottery Jar). In the first condition participants were 
presented with the drawing of the jars with money in both jars, in the second condition we 
presented participants with the drawing of the jars without money in the Charity Jar, and in 
the third condition we presented participants with a photograph of the jars with money in both 
jars. Participants were asked to complete the same task of distributing the coins over the two 
jars as in the grand survey. We asked participants to rate the task and the jars on three criteria: 
How real did the donating the UNICEF and take part in the lottery feel to you?, How likely 
did you perceive it that the jars were filled by other participants?, How likely is it that the 
coins that you have assigned to the jars will be visible for other participants? We found that 
although there was no significant difference between the criteria, participants rated the first 
condition generally highest. Thus, we chose to portray the jars with a drawing, filled with 
money, see Figures 1a-c in the Appendix. 
2
     The money raised in the Charity Jar will be donated to UNICEF. 
3
     Assumptions were checked for factorial ANOVA: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances was non-significant, thus homoscedasticity can be assumed (F(8, 359) = 0.30, p = 
0.967).
 
No multicollinearity can be assumed as well (VIF social norm = 1.001, Tolerance social norm 
= 0.999; VIF recollection = 1.001, Tolerance recollection = 0.999).  
 
